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Consumers, when buying health insurance, do not know the exact value of each treat-
ment that they buy coverage for. This leads them to overvalue some treatments and
undervalue others. We show that the insurance market cannot correct these mistakes.
This causes research labs to overinvest in treatments that hardly add value compared to
current best practice. The government can stimulate R&D in breakthrough treatments by
excluding treatments with low value added from health insurance coverage. If the country
is rich enough such a government intervention in a private health insurance market raises
welfare.
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1. Introduction
Physicians worry that pharmaceutical companies introduce more and more drugs that hardly
add value (compared to existing treatments); yet these new drugs are sold with substantial
profits (Light and Lexchin, 2012; Deyo and Patrick, 2005). Economic theory predicts that –
absent collusion– new products which are only marginally better than existing ones only make
small profits. How can drugs with low value added lead to high profits? What are the effects
of this on research labs’ incentives to invest in R&D and dynamic efficiency? Can this explain
the innovation crisis where “pharmaceutical research and development turns out mostly mi-
nor variations on existing drugs, and most new drugs are not superior on clinical measures”
(Light and Lexchin, 2012).
The reason why quality and costs of new medical treatments are important is that health
care costs are increasing rapidly over time in most, if not all, developed countries. We know
that an important contributor to the increase in health care expenditure is the introduction
of new medical technologies (Garber, 2001; Deyo and Patrick, 2005; Chernew and Newhouse,
2011; Chernew and May, 2011). To the extent that these new technologies create more utility
than they cost, this form of technological progress is welfare enhancing. However, it is not clear
that the market only introduces technologies where the benefits exceed the costs.
There is a difference between private and public health insurance systems. In public sys-
tems (or in the public part of the health insurance system, like the mandatory insurance in
countries like Austria, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands; see Jakubowski and Busse (1998)
and Thomson et al. (2012)) there is a central board that decides which (new) treatments are
covered by health insurance and which are not. A well known institute performing cost effective-
ness (CE) analysis to determine whether a treatment should be covered by insurance is NICE
in the UK. Other countries where centrally organized CE analysis plays a role include Aus-
tralia, Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden (see Dranove (2003), Drummond (2007),
Garber and Sculpher (2011, pp. 487), Morton and Kyle (2011, pp. 806) and Meltzer and Smith
(2011, pp. 436)).
In private health insurance markets (like the private part of the current US market), there
is no central board deciding which treatments are covered by health insurance.1 In the US,
currently the (federal) Food and Drug Administration (FDA) checks whether a new treatment
is safe and whether it is effective (does better than a placebo treatment) but it does not check
whether it is better than existing treatments2 nor whether it is cost effective (Deyo and Patrick
(2005, chapter 12) and Danzon (2011, pp. 523)). Hence, the decision on what treatments to
cover by private health insurance is left to the market.
Although private insurers can do CE analysis themselves to determine which treatments to
cover, some people are concerned about leaving coverage decisions to the market. In particular,
there is a worry that the market tends to over-reward medical innovations that hardly add
value compared to existing treatments (Deyo and Patrick, 2005). For instance, consumers
1Government funded health insurance in the US can have a central board deciding which treatments are
covered. See, for instance, Medicaid in Oregon (Dranove, 2003; Oberlander, 2007). With the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) the government has to choose which treatments belong to the “essential
health benefits package” (McDonough, 2011, pp. 113).
2This is different in Europe where the European Medicines Evaluation Agency does compare with existing
treatments (Danzon, 2011, pp. 524).
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don’t know the value of medical treatments and may be too optimistic about the effect of
a particular new treatment. Others believe that the market can correct misperceptions of
uninformed consumers (Danzon and Pauly, 2001). To illustrate, an often heard argument in
favor of the use of formularies by health insurers is that insurers are better at judging the value
of new treatments and drugs than consumers are (Morton and Kyle, 2011, pp. 791). Hence,
insurers –in the interest of their customers– exclude drugs that are not worth their costs.3
The question that we analyze is the following. Does the market decide efficiently (in terms
of total welfare) whether a new treatment is valuable enough that it should be covered by health
insurance? Or is there a role for the government in deciding which treatments can/should be
covered by private health insurance (see, for instance, CBO, 2007)? In order to answer this
question, we (i) analyze static and dynamic efficiency of a private health insurance market
and (ii) derive conditions under which efficiency can be enhanced by introducing a government
agency doing CE analysis to determine which medical innovations are allowed to be covered.4
The model introduces research labs investing in R&D to invent new treatments. Once a
treatment is invented, labs bargain with insurers to determine the price insurers have to pay the
lab if an insured patient needs the treatment (say, a new drug). Clearly, these prices are affected
by the fall back option of labs in case their treatment is not covered by insurance: selling to
patients on the uninsured market. The uninsured market is explicitly modeled. Finally, insurers
compete on the health insurance market and consumers can decide to buy or forgo insurance.
Although it is impossible (and undesirable) to capture the richness of the real world in
a model, we do capture some important aspects of health insurance markets (below we give
references to motivate these assumptions). First, consumers –when buying insurance– do not
necessarily know the value of each treatment that is covered by their insurance plan. The
number of treatments can be huge and they may help to cure diseases that the consumer does
not even know off (Liebman and Zeckhauser, 2008). Hence, a consumer can overestimate the
value of her insurance covering a certain treatment. Although consumers may be wrong about
the value of a particular treatment, there is little evidence that markets consistently over-value
medical innovations. The model is consistent with both these observations. Second, the policy
concern for covering a treatment in health insurance is not so much the disutility of consumption
risk (risk aversion) but access to care. If a treatment is not covered by insurance, some (poor)
people may not be able to afford the treatment when they need it. Third, when a patient needs
a certain treatment, a physician helps to guide the patient’s decision process. In other words, a
patient needing a specific treatment is better informed about the value of this treatment than
the consumer buying insurance. Finally, the offers between labs and insurers are private (in
the sense of not publicly known); we consider both a bidding and an offer game (interestingly,
these lead to similar equilibrium payoffs).
We find the following results. Because consumers do not necessarily know the value of
each treatment, firms tend to underinvest in break-through treatments. This reduces dynamic
efficiency (compared to first best). Also, if the country is “fairly rich” (to be made precise
below), it may be more profitable for a lab with a break-through innovation to sell on the
uninsured market. This reduces static efficiency as some poor people will not have access to
3Although the argument usually stops here, these (potentially misinformed) consumers still need to value
the different formularies offered by insurers. We model this explicitly below.
4One reason why the government should do CE analysis is to avoid duplication of the analysis (CBO, 2007;
Phelps, 2000). Although relevant, this is not the reason that we analyze here.
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this treatment. If the government excludes innovations with low value added from insurance
coverage, firms’ R&D incentives increase. This happens for two reasons: (i) being covered by
health insurance is now a signal about the treatment’s value added and (ii) R&D labs have to
work harder to qualify for health insurance. Finally, if the country is poor, some people will
not be able to afford excluded low value added treatments, reducing static efficiency. Overall,
total welfare increases due to government intervention in rich enough countries.
This paper is related to the literature in the following way. First, it is linked to the health
(economics) literature on CE analysis which is discussed in the next section. Second, a well
known result by Gaynor et al. (2000) says that static efficiency can be achieved by competitive
health care and insurance markets. Garber et al. (2006) consider whether this result extents
to dynamic efficiency. They show that when the coinsurance rate is set such that treatment
use is efficient (static efficiency), the incentive for inventing the treatment is not. Depending
on the distribution of treatment benefits, the incentive to invent treatments may well be ex-
cessive. Welfare can be increased by regulating treatment prices and limiting the duration of
a patent. Lakdawalla and Sood (2009) argue in favour of public health insurance to decouple
consumer prices from manufacturer prices in a way that balances static and dynamic efficiency.
Jena and Philipson (2008) consider the effects of CE analysis on innovation. They argue that
setting a CE threshold in a public system is equivalent to regulating treatment prices. Indeed,
a lab that knows what the value added of its treatment is, sets its price so high as to just satisfy
the CE threshold. Then by setting the threshold, government can balance static and dynamic
efficiency effects.
The difference with our paper is the following. First, we consider a market setting without
government intervention in the form of price regulation. We analyse whether there is a role for
the government in determining which treatments are allowed to be covered by private health
insurance. Parties then determine prices in a bilateral bargaining process. Second, in our
model, consumers do not necessarily know the value of each invented treatment. Third, in the
papers mentioned, the innovation is given and firms need to invest a fixed cost to invent the
treatment (i.e. the focus is on the extensive margin). We consider the case where firms invest to
raise the quality of their innovation (i.e. we focus on the intensive margin). By working harder
and testing more, the firm can reduce complications and side effects of the treatment, make the
treatment effective for different forms of a disease etc. This process of treatment improvement
can be affected by the government by raising the value added threshold that a new treatment
must pass before it can be covered by insurance. CE analysis is a natural instrument to affect
R&D incentives in health care. Whether a treatment is covered by health insurance has a big
effect on profits and hence on R&D incentives (Weisbrod, 1991; Chernew and Newhouse, 2011).
We assume that insurers know the value of the different treatments, while consumers
do not (when they buy insurance). This links the paper to the literature on experts (see
Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006, for an overview). This literature analyzes experts’ incentives
to provide correct services to consumers who do not know what they need. Questions analyzed
include: can the market prevent under- and over-supply of services. There are two main differ-
ences with the model below. First, in our model, the consumer is not exploited in equilibrium:
the insurance premium does not exceed the value of insurance for the consumer. Second, we
focus on the effect of the consumer’s lack of information on the bargaining between the insurer
and the research lab.
Finally, Liebman and Zeckhauser (2008) stress that rational decision making is not a good
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assumption when analyzing trade offs in health insurance markets. They discuss the impli-
cations for health care policy of findings in the behavioural economics literature, like status
quo bias, anxiety and the way people deal with uncertain events in the future. We also deviate
from full rationality, in the sense that consumers do not know the value of each treatment when
buying health insurance. However, we focus on the question whether the market can correct
consumers’ misperceptions. And what the effect of government intervention is on static and
dynamic efficiency.
Chandra and Skinner (2012) argue that part of the growth in US health care expenditure
is due to the adoption of ineffective (Category II and III, in their terminology) treatments.
They introduce a model to explain why ineffective treatments are used once they are covered
by insurance. This paper and Skinner (2011) document that a market –left to itself– does
indeed cover treatments that are not worth their costs. Their work motivates our question why
consumers buy insurance coverage for such treatments. Further, we analyze the incentives to
invent/introduce treatments and how government intervention changes these incentives.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a brief overview of CE analysis.
Then we introduce the model. Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium in simple contracts without
government intervention. Then we consider the effects on static and dynamic efficiency of the
government excluding low value added treatments from insurance coverage. Section 6 asks
the question whether the market can exclude low quality treatments itself without government
intervention. Extensions of the model are discussed and finally we conclude. Proofs of the
results can be found in the appendix.
2. CE analysis
Broadly speaking, the goal of CE analysis is to maximize “health” subject to a resource con-
straint. In most public systems, the resource constraint takes the form of a budget constraint.
The idea of CE analysis is to rank treatments in terms of the health gained per unit of the
budget spent. Then starting from the top of this ranking, treatments are added to health
insurance coverage until the budget is spent. Although this idea is intuitive, applying it in
practice is not straightforward (Basu and Philipson, 2010).
CE analysis can be done in a number of ways. To illustrate, one distinction is the way the
health benefits of treatments are measured. Although different authors use different terminol-
ogy,5 one can distinguish CE, Cost Utility (CU) and Cost Benefit (CB) analysis. All three
methods work with the same concept of monetary costs (price of a treatment).6 CE analysis
measures benefits in terms of, say, “years of life gained” without putting a value on this. In
other words, 3 years in perfect health is the same as 3 years living with an impairment, like not
being able to walk the stairs. CU analysis tends to use QALYs (Quality Adjusted Life Year)
to quantify the difference between life years with full health and with impairments. Finally,
CB analysis puts a monetary value on a QALY. To illustrate, NICE tends to work with a
value of 20,000–30,000 pounds per QALY (NICE, 2007). Studies based on surveys and revealed
preference come up with a value between $100,000–300,000; see, for instance, Dranove (2003,
5For instance, the term CE analysis is also used to describe cost benefit analysis in a health care context. In
this paper, we also use CE analysis in this broader sense.
6This in contrast to comparative effectiveness research which does not consider costs (Chandra et al., 2011).
5
chapter 8) and Chandra and Skinner (2012, pp. 654).
Other issues in CE analysis include how to deal with uncertainty of benefits, how to discount
benefits over time, how to measure costs and how to take equity considerations into account.
See Drummond et al. (2005), Garber (2000) and Garber and Sculpher (2011) for details. As our
model below is rather simple in this respect, these distinctions do not matter for our analysis.
There, however, is a difference on how we measure treatment costs and how this is usually
done. In a public system with a budget, the relevant cost concept is the price of the treatment.
The same is true when a private insurer uses CE analysis to determine which treatments to
cover. However, we are interested in total welfare and then a price is a transfer from one party
to another. From a total welfare point of view, the relevant concept is the production cost of
a treatment. Jena and Philipson (2013); Pauly (2007) argue that the use of treatment prices
instead of costs leads to suboptimal outcomes from a total welfare point of view.
As mentioned in the introduction, in many countries the government uses CE analysis to
determine which treatments are covered by the public/mandatory part of health insurance. In
contrast, US law explicitly prohibits the FDA (and any other federal agency) to do CE analysis
(Garber and Sculpher, 2011, pp. 490/1). Hence, one would expect that private insurers then do
CE analysis themselves, but they don’t. Indeed, “[w]ith rare exceptions, in the United States
private health insurers ... avoid explicit use of cost-effectiveness analysis to determine coverage...
Safety and effectiveness, but not cost, are considered in formal coverage decision making”
(Garber and Sculpher, 2011, pp. 490). Similar statements can be found in Deyo and Patrick
(2005, pp. 54) and Meltzer and Smith (2011, pp. 436). As no CE analysis is done, treatments
that are not worth their costs are covered by health insurance.
At first sight, this seems related to marginal or flat-of-the-curve medicine (see Dranove, 2000,
pp. 36 for a discussion). Because of insurance (and many physicians not being trained to think
in terms of benefits and costs) patients keep on trying treatments where the expected benefits
of additional treatment do not exceed the social costs. However, this argument is conditional
on insurance covering these treatments (in these circumstances). Once I have insurance that
covers a certain treatment, I am indeed tempted to use the treatment even though benefits may
be low and monetary costs (for society) high. Ex ante, a rational consumer prefers insurance
contracts with high quality/price ratios. Hence, one would expect there to be an incentive for
insurers to use CE analysis and only cover treatments with substantial value added.
The model shows why insurers do not have an incentive to do CE analysis and what the
effects are if the government excludes marginal innovations (with low value added over existing
treatments) from insurance coverage. We conclude this section with examples of treatments
with low value added that were covered in the US health insurance market.7 As we show below,
once a marginal treatment is covered, it can command a price in excess of its social value.
Deyo and Patrick (2005) discuss a number of US cases “where a new treatment has some
very small advantage over alternative treatments, but at a very high price. The number of such
7Two remarks on the private health insurance market in the US. First, this market is dominated by employer
based group contracts; not individual contracts. However, group contracts are likely to be sensitive to individual
preferences, which is what we need in the model. Second, the private market in the US is not helped by
Medicare’s coverage decisions that are not motivated by CE analysis (Chandra and Skinner, 2012, pp. 27).
Once a treatment is covered by Medicare, it is hard for a private insurer to exclude this treatment from its
own coverage. This reiterates how hard it is for insurers to communicate cost effectiveness of treatments to
consumers.
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treatments is enormous” (page 252). In the 1990s, US insurers covered high-dose chemotherapy
with autologous bone marrow transplant to treat (advanced) breast cancer. Treatment cost per
patient were $80,000 while, in fact, this new treatment had no advantage over cheaper existing
chemotherapy (Mello and Brennan, 2001). Kelly et al. (2001) compare two treatments for lung
cancer: paclitaxel plus carboplatin (PC) and vinorelbine and cisplatin (VC). Whereas PC
was $8,000 more expensive (per patient) than VC, the survival results (and other outcome
measures) are basically the same. Nonetheless PC was covered by insurance and extensively
used. In the 1990s an expensive and new class of drugs –calcium-channel blockers– were used
to treat high blood pressure. However, due to side effects, these were not better than existing
cheaper treatments of hypertension (Fischer and Avorn, 2004).
Similar examples can be given for medical devices. Consider the use of pedicle screws
to treat back pain. Comparing a spinal fusion operation with and without pedicle screws,
Deyo et al. (2004, pp. 724) conclude that the incremental cost effectiveness ratio is more than
$3 million per QALY. This is huge compared to the 20.000-30.000 pounds per QALY benchmark
used by NICE in the UK or even the $100,000-300,000 value per life year discussed above.
Skinner (2011, pp. 47) mentions the use of “very expensive treatment without known benefits
for patients (like proton beam therapy for prostate cancer)”. Also, it is not clear whether
prostate cancer screening in apparently healthy men offers any benefits (Deyo and Patrick 2005,
pp. 130 and Skinner 2011, pp. 70). Other examples include the artificial heart, Gliadel wafer
(Deyo and Patrick, 2005, pp. 21,45) and “robotic” surgery tools (Chandra and Skinner, 2012,
pp. 670).
Our model focuses on this type of treatments that get overvalued by the market. There
are other ways in which the market (due to consumer misperception) can force health insurers
to act in ways that are not socially efficient. The effects and remedies are similar to what we
model below (see section 7.5).
3. Model
The model describes three markets (see figure 1). First, there is the treatment procurement
market. Second, the market where research labs sell directly to (uninsured) consumers. Finally,
the health insurance market where insurance companies compete for customers.
On the treatment procurement market, research labs bargain with insurers. For instance, in
the pharmaceutical sector, PBMs (Pharmacy Benefit Management firms) are important players
on the treatment procurement market (Scherer 2000, pp. 1325 and Dranove 2000, pp. 107). If
an insurer and lab come to an agreement on prices, the insurer can cover the lab’s treatment in
its health insurance contracts. These contracts are sold to consumers on the health insurance
market. If a treatment is not covered by a patient’s insurance contract, she can buy the
treatment on the uninsured market.
Treatments can be sold on the uninsured market for three reasons: (i) a consumer can decide
not to buy insurance for a treatment; this treatment then needs to be bought on the uninsured
market, (ii) a lab can decide to sell (only) directly to consumers and not contract with insurers
and (iii) the government can decide that insurers are not allowed to cover a certain treatment.
In that case, the treatment can only be sold on the uninsured market.
First, we describe consumer behavior. Then we specify how firms interact.
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Figure 1: Three sets of players (oval) and three markets (rectangle).
3.1. utility
The market imperfection that we are interested in is that consumers do not know the value
of each treatment when buying insurance. So they may over/undervalue coverage of treat-
ments. In the medical literature, there are a number of studies documenting consumers’
misperceptions of the value of treatments (see Habib et al., 2008; Mello and Brennan, 2001;
Ravdin et al., 1998; Rothberg et al., 2010; Siegel et al., 2008). However, there is little evidence
that consumers get the value of treatments wrong in a systematic way. Cremieux et al. (2007),
Cutler and McClellan (2001), Cutler et al. (2006), Cutler (2007) and Kleinke (2001) all suggest
that over the past decades in the US the growth in health care expenditure due to the intro-
duction of new treatments has been worth it in terms of value created.8 If consumers would
consistently over-estimate the value of new treatments, treatments would be adopted where the
value created does not cover costs, which is inconsistent with this evidence.9
A simple way to capture that consumers –when buying insurance– can overvalue some
treatments but are not systematically wrong is to assume that they can get mixed up. In
particular, they may incorrectly attribute the value of one treatment to another treatment. To
illustrate, they have read in the newspaper that there is a new breakthrough treatment for
heart failure. They read their insurance contract which reimburses a new heart treatment; is
this the one they read about? Alternatively, two treatments are always used together (like beta
blockers after heart surgery; Skinner, 2011, pp. 66). Hence, from past experience of family and
friends, consumers know the value of this combination correctly but may attribute incorrectly
value to each individual treatment.
8Because consumers overvalue some treatments (see examples in section 2) but are right on average, it must
be the case that they tend to undervalue other treatments. Kleinke (2001) argues that there are drugs with
high benefits that are not valued by the market. Volpp et al. (2008) discusses a scheme to pay people for taking
their medication; suggesting that people undervalue the benefits of these treatments.
9Note that the evidence by Cutler and others is also consistent with consumers consistently under-estimating
the value of new treatments. However, this seems unlikely given the examples mentioned in section 2. Further,
policy makers worry about the high growth rate of health care expenditures which is partly caused by the
development of new treatments (see Chernew and Newhouse (2011) for an overview). This seems hard to
reconcile with the assumption that people tend to systematically under-estimate the value of new treatments.
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More formally, we assume that consumers partition the set of all treatments into subsets.
Elements in such a partition could be cancer treatment using chemo therapy, eye treatment
using laser technology, etc. Consumers are rational in the sense that within a subset of treat-
ments they know the total value that these treatments create. However, they may get confused
–when buying insurance– about the value created by a particular treatment.
A simple model to capture this is the following. There are two new treatments 1 and 2
which treat different (but related) conditions.10 Just to be clear, treatments 1 and 2 are in
the same subset of the partition of all treatments (hence they ”look similar” to the consumer),
but the treatments do not compete: they cure different conditions or are used in different
circumstances. The issue here is not that the consumer gets treated with the wrong medicine.
There is a probability µ1 > 0 that a consumer needs treatment 1 and a probability µ2 >
that she needs treatment 2.11 To ease notation, we assume that µ1 = µ2 = µ and the consumer
never needs both treatments (no co-morbidity).12
Treatment i raises utility by qi > 0 and is produced with constant marginal cost of pro-
duction ci. We assume that the treatment is safe. That is, a government agency like the FDA
excludes treatments with qi < 0. The current best treatment that cures the same condition
as i increases a patient’s utility by qoi and is produced with constant marginal costs c
o
i . Hence




i )). To ease notation, we




i = 0. Hence the value added of treatment i equals qi. The question is:
does the price that the lab inventing i receives on the market reflect its value qi?
To simplify further, we assume that qi ∈ {q
l, qh} with qh > ql > 0.13 We interpret qh as a
breakthrough treatment that offers big improvements over existing treatments. A ql treatment
is a marginal innovation that offers hardly an improvement over current best practice.
Before the consumer decides on which insurance contract to buy, she receives a signal about
treatment i’s quality level. The signal is either H or L indicating that i’s quality is qh or ql
resp. With probability g ∈ [1
2
, 1] the signals correctly reflect q1, q2. With probability 1− g, the
consumer gets confused and attributes q1 to treatment 2 and q2 to treatment 1. Let hl denote
the state of the world where one treatment has high quality and the other low quality. Then
there are three states of the world: ll, lh and hh. The assumption implies that the consumer
is never wrong about the state of the world; you cannot confuse the value of treatments when
these values are the same. But in state lh she may attribute the wrong value to a particular
treatment.14 This simple information structure causes a reversion to the mean in terms of
treatment values.
If the consumer receives signal H for treatment i and L for j 6= i, she updates her beliefs
10The reason why the conditions should be related is that it seems unlikely that a consumer would confuse a
treatment against a cold with a form of heart surgery.
11We do not consider adverse selection problems here; hence µi is the same for each consumer. Also there is
no moral hazard: consumers only get the treatment in case they need it.
12Allowing for co-morbidity complicates the expression of the profit maximizing price on the uninsured market,
without adding much insight. See section 7.
13See the webappendix at http://sites.google.com/site/janboonehomepage/home/webappendices for
the case where qi is drawn from a more general distribution.
14If we would allow for the case where in state ll (hh) the consumer receives a signal H (L), she would also
over- (under)estimate the value of treatments in states ll (hh). This further reduces labs’ incentives to invest
in R&D and increases the benefits of government intervention.
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about quality in the following way:15
q̄i = gq
h + (1− g)ql (1)
q̄j = gq
l + (1− g)qh (2)
If the signal is perfectly informative, g = 1 and q̄i = qi in each case (no reversion to the mean).
We say in this case that the consumer is perfectly informed. If the signal is uninformative g = 1
2
and q̄i = q̄j = (qi+qj)/2. Note that it is always the case that q̄i+ q̄j = qi+qj : consumers are not
systematically wrong. They know the aggregate value of new treatments which is consistent
with the evidence by Cutler and others cited above. We say that consumers over(under)value
treatment i if q̄i > (<)qi.
The important characteristic of this information structure, that we use below, is that for
g < 1 there is an externality between treatments in the same set of the partition: q̄i depends
on qj (j 6= i).
We assume all consumers have the same partition of treatments and receive the same signal.
This implies that everyone has the same valuation for insured coverage of a treatment. Hence
there is no role for price discrimination in the health insurance market.
Two remarks here. First, extending the model to T different treatments (instead of 2) that
the consumer cannot distinguish is straightforward but tedious as the number of cases that
needs to be considered increases. This will become clear below. Second, the utility structure
that we use below is linear. Hence, there can be subsets of treatments (in the consumer’s
partition of all treatments) for heart, lung, liver etc. conditions. The overall effect is then the
sum of the effects for each case (assuming no co-morbidity). Hence, from now on, we focus on
one subset of the partition of all treatments.
An agent can buy health insurance at premium σ. Consumers differ in income such that
some may not be able to afford treatment on the uninsured market. However, we assume that
µ is small enough that everyone can afford to buy insurance. Hence we do not consider a
role for the government in reducing insurance coverage to keep health insurance affordable for
everyone. Although this is an important topic as well (Garber, 2001), it is beyond the scope of
this paper. See Boone (2013) for an analysis of this case.
The set of treatments covered by agent l’s health insurance is denoted by ιl. We assume
that health insurance covers the costs of these treatments completely.16 The set of treatments
not covered is denoted by υl. Hence we have ιl ∪ υl = {1, 2} and ιl ∩ υl = ∅.
In case agent l needs a treatment j in the set υl, she can decide to buy that treatment at
uninsured price puj . We assume that the agent cannot spend more than βl on the uninsured
market due to a budget constraint. This budget constraint is the reason why the agent buys
health insurance. This is different from the standard argument for buying insurance: a concave
utility function which makes the agent risk averse. The following consideration motivates this
modelling choice.
As mentioned in the introduction, we are interested in access to care. There is empirical
evidence to suggest that budget constraints play an important role in the decision whether or not
15Below we consider symmetric labs, hence there is no reason for consumers to expect a priori that, say,
q1 = q
h is more likely than q2 = q
h. Further, we assume that consumers cannot observe labs’ R&D investments,
hence these cannot be used to affect consumers’ beliefs.
16Because in the model there are no moral hazard nor adverse selection issues on the side of pa-
tients/consumers, there is no need for insurers to offer less than full coverage.
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to buy treatment when people are uninsured (or under-insured). See, for instance, Piette et al.
(2004a), Piette et al. (2004b), Goldman et al. (2007), Schoen et al. (2008) and Schoen et al.
(2010) for evidence of access (to health care) problems due to financial constraints. That is,
even if the treatment is worth it (in the sense that qi exceeds the price on the uninsured market,
pui ), the agent may not be able to afford it. There may be other things that the family needs to
buy and it may not be possible to borrow enough money to finance the treatment. By pooling
risks, health insurance allows the agent to afford treatment if she needs it. Nyman (1999) is the
first to estimate the access value of health insurance. He argues that this access value exceeds
the value of health insurance for financial risk-bearing.
Further, we consider a policy where the government excludes certain treatments from health
insurance coverage. On the one hand, this may improve dynamic efficiency (see below), but
the trade off is that some patients cannot afford the excluded treatments.
We assume that β ≥ 0 is distributed with density (cumulative distribution) function f(F ).
This distribution of budgets that an agent can spend on the uninsured market captures the
income distribution.
Finally, the focus of this paper is on the imperfection that people do not necessarily know
the value of a treatment at the moment that they buy health insurance. At the moment that
someone needs a specific treatment, she usually decides together with her physician. We assume
that the physician reveals qi to a patient who needs treatment i. A patient who is not insured
for treatment i compares the price of i on the uninsured market, pui with qi and the budget
constraint β that she faces. An insured patient will always use treatment i as the cost to the
patient is zero and qi > 0. Such an insured patient, after learning qi may see that the value
added of the treatment does not exceed the price the insurer has to pay; see Chandra et al.
(2011, pp. 27) for an example of this case.
Although there may be incentive issues with physicians and physicians may not know the
value of each treatment exactly themselves (Skinner, 2011; McGuire, 2011a), it seems reasonable
to assume that the patient is better informed about qi at the moment that she needs the
treatment than at the moment that she buys insurance. Few people go over the list of insured
treatments with their physician to determine the value of each single treatment. In fact, most
doctors do not want to give such advice (Liebman and Zeckhauser, 2008, pp. 7).
Expected utility of a consumer l with budget βl, set of (un)insured treatments ιl (υl) and


















There are three types of agents. First, there are consumers (described above) with mass nor-
malized to 1. Second, there are n ≥ 2 competing health insurers. Insurer Ii(i ∈ {a, b, ..., n})
contracts with research labs on the price for a treatment in case one of Ii’s insured needs such
17Note that being in state j (which means that the agent is ill in some way) can reduce the agent’s utility.
Since we use an additive utility structure (as in Garber et al. 2006) this is just a (negative) constant that can
be added to the agent’s expected utility. In other words, taking the disutility of illness into account does not
affect the agent’s optimal decision (while it would complicate notation).
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treatment. And insurers compete in prices when selling insurance to consumers. If the insurers
offer the same set ι of covered treatments, they compete in homogeneous products. If different
sets ι of covered treatments are offered at different prices, the utility structure described above
determines which insurer will sell in equilibrium. As usual, if consumers are indifferent between
the contracts offered by a group of insurers, they choose a contract randomly and end up being
distributed equally over these insurers. Further, if a consumer is indifferent between buying
insurance for some treatment(s) or not at all, she buys insurance.
Finally, there are the research labs Lj with j ∈ {1, 2}. A lab decides on contracts with
insurers and on a price puj at which Lj sells its treatment to uninsured patients. The govern-
ment’s CE analysis takes the form of a cut off level q ≥ 0 such that only treatments with qj > q
are allowed to be covered by health insurance.
We need to determine the equilibrium prices charged on the three markets in figure 1. We
start with the procurement market.
We denote the price per patient that Ii pays to Lj for its treatment p̃ij ≥ 0. We allow the
insurer and lab to use two-part tariffs. The fixed part is denoted by tij (if tij < 0 the lab pays
the insurer). In the equilibrium we analyze in this section, it turns out that prices are linear
(tij = 0 for all i, j).
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The assumption that research labs set two prices (one for insured and one for uninsured
patients) is in line with reality. This can be implemented in two ways (see e.g. Scherer (2000,
pp. 1326) for details): (i) insurers buy from wholesalers at the list price and then the manu-
facturer issues a rebate check to the insurer for the amount of the negotiated discount (in our
notation this discount equals puj − p̃ij), (ii) wholesaler supplies the insurer at the discounted
price and receives a “chargeback” payment from the manufacturer to cover the difference.
Within the model, we need the labs to commit to a price p̃ij to insurers. If this would
not happen, and an insurer would add treatment j to its set of insured treatments, Lj would
set a very high price. Given that an insurer covers j in its contract, its insured will demand
treatment j as the insured do not care about the price. To prevent such hold up problems, the
insurer needs to contract with Lj before adding j to the set of treatments that are reimbursed
by its insurance contract.
There are two contracting assumptions that look reasonable in this context. First, when an
insurer has contracted with Lj and agreed on a price p̃ij , the insurer can still ask its customers to
buy treatment j on the uninsured market if this is cheaper (puj < p̃ij) and then reimburse them
afterwards. It seems impossible for Lj to make sure that it only sells at p
u
j to customers without
insurance. How would a customer prove to Lj that she does not have health insurance? Hence
in equilibrium it will be the case that puj ≥ p̃ij. Second, a contract between Ii and Lj cannot
force Ii to offer coverage of treatment j. The contract is an option to buy; not a requirement
for Ii to buy. In reality, we are not aware of quantity forcing contracts on this market. One
explanation for this can be that at the end of the day it is not the insurer who decides on
treatments but a physician. Hence, it is hard for an insurer to influence the quantity bought
18We assume that usage can be monitored such that p̃ij can indeed be used. This is clear in the pharmaceutical
sector. It may be less obvious –but not impossible– in case of a medical device like an MRI scan. Also in the
case of medical devices, labs can use service contracts that allow for metering. Further, use of MRI scan or
surgical procedures will usually be charged by a provider (e.g. hospital) not necessarily by the inventor. To
simplify the model, we have not added providers as a separate set of players in figure 1. We leave the analysis
of such cases for future research.
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of a certain treatment.
The timing of the game is as follows:
0. government sets minimimum standard q for treatments that can be insured
1. labs L1, L2 invest in R&D to invent new treatments
2. consumers learn signals and derive q̄1, q̄2
3. R&D labs contract privately with insurers
4. insurers decide on which treatments to cover ι and set σ (interim unobservability)
5. consumers decide whether to buy insurance and –if so– from which insurer
6. R&D labs set uninsured prices pui
7. consumers fall ill and need treatment which is either covered by their insurance or not
Here we only consider stages 2 and further. Stages 0 and 1 are analyzed below. We assume
in this section that q = 0; that is, no government intervention. Hence each treatment can be
covered by health insurance.
In stage 3, firm Lj offering treatment j that leads to utility qj (for the patient who needs
this) bargains with insurers to get her treatment covered by insurance. This bargaining is
modeled in two ways: we consider both an offer and a bidding game. If consumers are perfectly
informed (g = 1), the situation where upstream labs make offers to downstream insurers is an
offer game (following the terminology in Segal and Whinston 2003, pp. 758). We extent the
term offer game also to the situation where the consumer only knows q̄1, q̄2 (with g < 1) and
hence there are externalities between upstream firms. In the bidding game, the downstream
insurers make offers to the upstream labs.
In particular, in the offer game, the research labs make simultaneously and independently
take-it-or-leave-it offers (p̃ij, tij) to the insurer. Each insurer simultaneously and independently
either accepts or rejects the offer made to it by a research lab. In the bidding game, the
insurers make simultaneously and independently take-it-or-leave-it offers (p̃, t) to the research
labs. Then the labs decide simultaneously and independently whether or not to accept offers.
Most papers consider either an offer or a bidding game. Outcomes tend to differ in these two
games. Intuitively, the party making the offer has more bargaining power and can appropriate
a bigger part of the surplus generated. In our model, however, the outcomes hardly differ. This
is because insurers compete in prices on the health insurance market and offer homogeneous
products if they cover the same treatments. Even if insurers make the offers, the rents are
competed away and appropriated by the research labs.
In line with how these negotiations work in reality (Danzon 2011, pp. 530 and Morton and Kyle
2011, pp. 790), we assume that offers are made privately.19 To illustrate what this means: in-
surer Ia does not know the details of the contract that Ib has with Lj ; similarly, Lj does not
19Two remarks on public offers. First, if offers are made publicly, consumers can –in principle– observe them
as well. This creates possibilities for parties to signal quality by their contract offers. We do not think this is
a relevant option in reality and signalling can be ignored with private offers. Second, from a theoretical point
of view, it is straightforward to verify that the equilibrium in proposition 1 is also an equilibrium with public
offers. The proof of this proposition is a bit more involved with private offers because we need to specify beliefs.
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know the details of the contract that Ia has with the other lab, etc. In other words, in both
games parties cannot commit to stop renegotiating contracts with other parties. That is, even
if, say, L1 would publicly announce its contract, Ia cannot be sure that L1 does not privately
offer Ib a discount on the publicly announced prices. Since the details of the contracts between
insurers and pharmaceutical companies remain confidential, insurers set prices without knowing
the details of each others’ contracts. Rey and Vergé (2004) call this interim unobservability.
As discussed by Segal (1999), the literature using private contracts often assumes, so called,
passive beliefs. With passive beliefs, if a firm receives an out-of-equilibrium offer, it assumes
that all other firms did receive the equilibrium offer. This is not always a reasonable assumption
and we do not assume passive beliefs here for two reasons. First, for pricing games (as we have
here) Rey and Vergé (2004) derive a condition under which there is no equilibrium with passive
beliefs. Indeed in our set up, an equilibrium with passive beliefs does not exist.20 Second, it
seems more reasonable that a firm receiving an out-of-equilibrium offer asks “given the offer
that I have received, what are the optimal offers from this party to my competitors?” These
are called wary beliefs (McAfee and Schwartz, 1994), which we use below.
Following McAfee and Schwartz (1994) and Rey and Vergé (2004), we define wary beliefs
in the offer [bidding] game as follows. When Ii[Lj ] receives a contract offer (p̃ij, tij), it believes
that
• Lj [Ii] expects it to accept this contract
• Lj [Ii] offers Ik(k 6= i)[Lk(k 6= j)] the contract (p̃kj, tkj)[(p̃ik, tik)] that maximizes its profits
among the contracts that are acceptable to Ik[Lk], and
• Ik[Lk] reasons in the same way.
We assume that it is not possible to contract with agent i on the details of the contract
with j. In the next section, we focus on simple contracts that only specify p̃ij, tij . In section
6, we allow parties to use exclusion clauses. In that case, parties can contract on whether an
insurer offers coverage of certain treatments, or not.
In period 4, the insurance companies compete in determining which treatments to cover and
setting prices (insurance premium σ). In period 5, consumers decide whether and (if so) which
insurance contract to buy. In period 6, research labs set prices for people without insurance.
Finally, some people fall ill and need to be treated either financed by their insurance company
or they buy treatment on the uninsured market (if they can afford it).
4. Market equilibrium
This section characterizes the static and dynamic efficiency of the market outcome (without
government intervention). As long as the uninsured market is sufficiently unprofitable for h-
treatments, the insurance market does not unravel. In this case the market outcome is efficient
from a static point of view. Unless consumers are perfectly informed (g = 1 in equations
(1), (2)) there is underinvestment in R&D in the market outcome.
On the other hand, the proof of proposition 2 –which derives bounds on equilibrium payoffs– is a bit more
involved with public offers as the acceptance decision depends on an agent’s own offer and on the offers to other
parties. With private offers, the acceptance decision can only depend on an agent’s own offer.
20See footnote 23 below.
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4.1. static efficiency
In both the bidding and the offer game we first characterize a symmetric perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. Then we derive upper and lower bounds on payoffs in any equilibrium outcome.
First, we need some notation. We define p∗ = argmaxp p(1 − F (p)). This is the profit
maximizing uninsured price for a treatment with qj ≥ p
∗. As patients are guided by their
physicians when choosing treatment, they never buy treatment j on the uninsured market if
puj > qj . We assume that p(1−F (p)) is non-decreasing in p ∈ [0, p
∗]. Hence the monopoly price
that maximizes profits on the uninsured market is given by pmj = min{p
∗, qj}, where j denotes
lab Lj or its quality level j ∈ {l, h}.
It is useful to introduce a smallest money unit ε > 0 in order to break ties. We assume that








As we think of ε as a dollar or euro or even a cent, this assumption does not seem stringent.
The interesting case is the one where some people cannot afford to buy the h-treatment on
the uninsured market if it is sold at the social value it creates:
F (qh) > 0 (5)
Indeed, if we would assume that F (qh) = 0, there is no need to have insurance in the model
(as everyone has access to all treatments without insurance) and the first best outcome can be
achieved.
We want to understand whether the market biases research towards marginal l-innovations
at the expense of R&D for breakthrough h-treatments. In order to analyse this, we need to
know the profits that the research labs make in the market outcome.
Proposition 1 Consider the case with q = 0 and assume without loss of generality that q1 ≤ q2.
In a symmetric perfect Bayesian pure strategy equilibrium with wary beliefs we have the following
for insurer Ii and lab Lj.
21 In the offer game:





ι = {1, 2} πi = 0 σ = µ(q̄1 + q̄2) (6)
πj = µq̄j p̃j = q̄j tj = 0 p
u
j ≥ q̄j (7)





ι = {1} πi = 0 σ = µq
l (8)
π1 = µq
l p̃1 = q













21The case with q̄2 = (1−F (pm2 ))p
m
2
in the offer game (q̄2 − ε = (1−F (pm2 ))p
m
2
in the bidding game) is a bit
tedious because of ties. As it is non-generic (small perturbations to g and thus to q̄1,2 make this disappear) it
is not considered here.
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In the bidding game:





ι = {1, 2} πi = 0 σ = µ(q̄1 + q̄2 − 2ε) (11)
πj = µ(q̄j − ε) p̃j = q̄j − ε tj = 0 p
u
j ≥ q̄j − ε (12)








1 ≤ q1 − ε:
22
ι = {1} πi = 0 σ = µ(q
l − ε) (13)
π1 = µ(q
l − ε) p̃1 = q
l − ε t1 = 0 p
u
1 ≥ q
l − ε (14)









The proof in the appendix shows that there are no profitable deviations from the equilibrium
in the proposition.23 As we think of the money unit ε as being small, equilibrium payoffs are
basically the same in the offer and bidding games.
If expected quality q̄2 exceeds uninsured profits per patient for the (weakly) highest quality
treatment (pm2 (1 − F (p
m
2 ))), both treatments are covered in equilibrium. Firms use linear
contracts with p̃j = q̄j for each treatment j (and tj = 0). In equilibrium, insurers make zero
profits as Bertrand competition forces the premium down to what they have to pay the labs.
Lab Lj makes a profit equal to µq̄j. Hence a low quality lab with qj < q̄j free rides on the high
quality lab (qj > q̄j). The l-treatment gets covered by health insurance and the l-lab is paid
more than its treatment is worth.
In other words, when firms use contracts that just specify prices (and no exclusion clauses)
it is not possible for insurers to “correct” consumers’ incorrect perception of a treatment’s value
(in case q̄j 6= qj). In this sense, there is not much reason for private insurers to do CE analysis
(as, indeed, they hardly do in the US). This incorrect perception filters through in the profits
that labs earn in equilibrium.
In the model, we can assume that insurers know q1,2. Yet, the prices that they pay research
labs are determined by consumers’ perceptions q̄1,2. The equilibrium suggests that if insurers
would have to invest in CE analysis to find out q1,2, they would in fact be better off investing in
marketing surveys to find out how consumers value treatments. This can explain why private
health insurers in the US hardly invest in CE analysis, as mentioned above.
Profit on the uninsured market can only exceed µq̄j if one lab has a high quality treatment
and the other a low quality treatment.24 The trade off for the h-lab is then the following. On
the one hand, it can sell on the uninsured market, but then 1 − F (pmh ) patients cannot afford
the treatment. On the other hand, when selling on the insured market, everyone can afford the
treatment. But consumers value the h-treatment at q̄j < q
h.




> q1 − ε, then both treatments are sold on the uninsured market.
23 To see why an equilibrium with passive beliefs in the offer game does not exist, consider p̃j ≥ 3ε. Then a
deviating offer p̂j = 0, t̂j = µ(p̃j − ε) is accepted by an insurer. Making this deviating offer to all n ≥ 2 insurers
is a profitable deviation for the lab. In case p̃j ≤ 2ε, lab can offer p̂j = q̄j − ε, t̂j = 0. This offer is accepted by
an insurer since increasing σ by ∆σj = µ(q̄j − ε) and selling coverage of j is more attractive for consumers than
not covering treatment j.
24For g ∈ 〈1
2
, 1〉, q̄j can take on two values: (i) q̄j = gqj + (1 − g)qi if the signal is correct and (ii) q̄j =
gqi + (1− g)qj if the signal is not correct.
16
If the profit on the uninsured market is higher, the insurance market unravels as it is not
profitable for the h-lab to have its treatment covered by health insurance. The h-treatment
is not covered by health insurance and only the l-treatment can be insured. If consumers see
that only one treatment is covered by health insurance, they understand that the h-treatment
was withdrawn from the insurance market as pmh (1− F (p
m
h )) > q̄j . They infer that the covered
treatment has value ql.
Note that the market unravels only if the country is relatively rich in the sense that some
people can afford to buy the h-treatment without insurance at a high enough price that unin-
sured profits exceed insured profits for the h-lab. If the market does not unravel, it is efficient
from a static point of view. Indeed, everyone has access to the care that they need and prices
are only transfers from a total welfare point of view (but prices do affect dynamic efficiency, as
we see shortly).
If the market does unravel, then the loss in static efficiency is given by F (pmh )q
h: fraction
of people who cannot afford the h-treatment on the uninsured market times their utility loss.
Let e denote the equilibrium probability that a lab invents a h-treatment characterized below.
The probability that there is one h and one l treatment is given by 2e(1 − e). If pmh (1 −
F (pmh )) > gq
h + (1 − g)ql, then the probability that the market unravels equals 2e(1 − e). If
gqh + (1 − g)ql > pmh (1 − F (p
m
h )) > gq
l + (1 − g)qh, the probability that the market unravels
equals 2e(1 − e)(1 − g). If the market does not unravel, the market remains efficient from a
static point of view.
Note that if consumers are perfectly informed (g = 1), each lab receives the value it creates
(µqj) as profit. In this case, the market is always efficient from a static and (as we will see
below) dynamic point of view. Hence the model is set up in such a way that with fully informed
consumers there is no reason for government intervention. This is due to the assumptions that
everyone can afford health insurance and each innovator is a monopolist (hence there is no
appropriability effect nor a business stealing effect, see Mankiw and Whinston 1986).
Finally, even if consumers are not perfectly informed (g < 1), in equilibrium they value their
insurance contract correctly. If the market does not unravel, we have µ(q̄1 + q̄2) = µ(q1 + q2).
If the market does unravel, consumers understand that the insured treatment has quality ql.
This is consistent with evidence by Cutler and others cited in section 3.1 that the market does
not systematically over-value new treatments (although the market does overpay for some new
treatments).
The equilibrium payoffs determine the incentives for labs to invest in R&D (in stage 1 of
the game). In order to be able to determine labs’ R&D efforts, we need to know that labs’
profits do not vary (a lot) across equilibria.
Proposition 2 Assume that the insurance market does not unravel. The labs’ equilibrium
profits for the offer game satisfy πj ∈ [µ(q̄j − ε), µq̄j]. In the bidding game, assuming n ≥ 3 the
equilibrium profits for research labs satisfy πj ∈ [µ(q̄j − 2ε), µ(q̄j − ε)].
As noted above, if (1− F (pmj ))p
m
j > q̄j then the insurance market unravels and Lj ’s profits
can exceed µq̄j . As shown in the appendix, assuming n ≥ 3 in the bidding game allows to
avoid some ties in the proofs which simplifies the exposition. This assumption does not seem
restrictive.
The intuition why profits cannot vary by much across equilibria is the following. First, total
profits earned can never exceed the total value created µ(q1+q2). If this would happen, there is
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a player making losses who then has a profitable deviation. If lab Lj would earn πj > µq̄j on the
treatment procurement market, insurers can profitably deviate by dropping the contract with
j. This reduces their costs by πj while consumers reduce their valuation of such a deviating
insurance contract by µq̄j < πj . Hence costs fall faster than revenue (insurance premium σ).
Second, a lab’s profits cannot be much below µq̄j as again there would be a profitable deviation.
In the offer game, the lab itself would raise p̃j to increase its profits. In the bidding game, an
insurer would try to earn monopoly profits by outbidding it’s competitors in case πj was much
below µq̄j for lab Lj .
As we view the money unit ε as being small, to ease notation we write the equilibrium
profits for the research labs as in equations (7,9,10) for both the offer and the bidding game.
4.2. dynamic efficiency
To evaluate the dynamic efficiency of the equilibrium in proposition 1, we introduce a simple
R&D technology to determine labs’ incentives to innovate.
Labs can invest effort e ∈ [0, 1] to invent a high quality treatment where e equals the proba-
bility that a h-treatment is found. Effort cost is given by c(e) with c(0) = 0, c′(e), c′′(e), c′′′(e) >
0.25 Hence it is increasingly more costly to find a h-treatment with higher probability. To ease
the exposition, we prefer to ignore corner solutions in e; hence, we assume c′(0) = 0, c′(1) = +∞.
To see whether the market is dynamically efficient, first consider the first best R&D effort
e∗. First best effort solves the following maximization problem.
max
e
µ(eqh + (1− e)ql)− c(e)
Under first best, everyone (who needs it) has access to a treatment. Hence the social value of
a treatment qi equals µqi.
The first order condition for first best effort can be written as
c′(e∗) = µ(qh − ql) (16)
In the market outcome, we find the following.
Proposition 3 If g = 1 then the market is dynamically efficient: em = e∗. For g < 1, the
market under-invests in breakthrough treatments: em < e∗.
Unless consumers know the value of each treatment when buying insurance, the market
under-invests in R&D: em < e∗. By under-rewarding h-treatments and over-rewarding l-
treatments, the probability of inventing l-treatments is higher than in first best. So, indeed,
in this model the market is biased towards introducing marginal improvements over current
treatments as argued in Deyo and Patrick (2005) and Light and Lexchin (2012). It is more
attractive to introduce marginal improvements over current treatments than invest to find a
breakthrough treatment.
25This is a simple way to model the intensive margin of R&D effort. Alternatively, one can think of a set-up
where research ideas have an exogenous quality level q. Then the intensive margin plays a role if, say, a lab has
three ideas but due to (capital or labor market) constraints can only develop two of these ideas.
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5. Government intervention: CE analysis
The government policy that we consider here is that the government performs CE analysis to
determine which treatments are allowed to be covered by (private) insurance. CE analysis takes
the form here of a cut off value q such that treatments with value added q ≤ q are not allowed
to be covered by health insurance while treatments with q > q are allowed to be covered by
insurance.
This is different from the current use of CE analysis by an institute like NICE. In the UK,
NICE determines whether a treatment can be covered by public health insurance. We analyse
whether in a private health insurance market there is a role for the government determining
which treatments can be covered by health insurance. This government intervention in deter-
mining private health insurance coverage is recommended by, for instance, Diamond (1992, pp.
1242), Kleinke (2001, pp. 58) and Deyo and Patrick (2005, pp. 270). We derive conditions
under which the government can raise welfare by implementing q = ql.
5.1. static efficiency
If the government excludes l-treatments from insurance coverage (q = ql), we get the following
equilibrium. As above, we ignore the money unit ε.
Proposition 4 With q = ql, a treatment is covered by insurance if and only if it has quality




l . A lab with a
h-treatment earns πh = µq
h.
Because l-treatments are excluded from health insurance coverage, consumers know that any
treatment covered by insurance has value added qh.26 Hence, consumers value an insurance
contract that covers one (two) treatment(s) at (2)µqh. Due to competition between insurers,
labs can appropriate this value.
A l-treatment can only be sold on the uninsured market and because pml ≤ q
l we find that
πl ≤ µq
l (17)
Unlike the outcome with an unraveling insurance market (without government intervention),
the government outcome makes sure that everyone has access to the h-treatment. However, with
government intervention l-treatments are never covered by health insurance. Unless 1−F (pml ) =
1, the government outcome is not efficient from a static point of view. Some people who cannot
afford to buy the l-treatment on the uninsured market have to go without.
Assume g < 1. Comparing static efficiency in the market without and with government
intervention, we find the following. If the country is relatively poor in the sense that (i) the




h ) and (ii) some people cannot afford to buy the l-
treatment on the uninsured market (F (pml ) > 0), the market yields higher static efficiency than
government intervention. If the country is relatively rich such that (i) the market does unravel
26The result that government CE analysis leads to h-labs’ profits equal to their social value is due to the
assumption that qj ∈ {ql, qh}. In a model where qj is continuously distributed, the imposition of q by the
government raises (reduces) the conditional expectation of qj given that treatment j is (not) covered by health
insurance. Also in such a model government intervention raises R&D incentives. See the webappendix in
footnote 13 for an analysis of this case.
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h ) and (ii) everyone can afford to buy the l-treatment on the uninsured
market (F (pml ) = 0), government intervention yields higher static welfare.
In the case where the market unravels and F (pml ) > 0, it is not clear which yields higher
static welfare. On the one hand, the loss in welfare is smaller for the outcome with government
intervention (F (pml )q
l < F (pmh )q
h because pml ≤ p
m
h and q
l < qh). On the other hand, the
weight of the loss in expected static welfare equals 2em(1 − em) in the market outcome if
gqh + (1 − g)ql < pmh (1 − F (p
m
h )) (2e
m(1 − em)(1 − g) if gqh + (1 − g)ql > pmh (1 − F (p
m
h )) >
gql+(1− g)qh) and 2[(1− eg)2+ eg(1− eg)] with government intervention. As we show shortly,
eg > em, but in general we cannot rank the expected loss in static efficiency with and without
government intervention. As noted above, if consumers are perfectly informed (g = 1), the
market outcome is first best and government intervention can only reduce welfare.
5.2. dynamic efficiency
The following result shows that government intervention of the form q = ql leads to higher
R&D effort than in the market outcome. In fact, the R&D effort can be excessive in the sense
that it exceeds e∗.
Proposition 5 With q = ql, R&D effort is given by
c′(eg) = µ(qh − (1− F (pml ))p
m
l ) (18)
If 1− F (ql) = 1 then eg = e∗. Otherwise eg > e∗.
If everyone can afford to buy l-treatment at its social value (1−F (ql) = 1), then the outcome
with government intervention is first best. The R&D incentives are first best and the outcome
is also static efficient as everyone can afford to buy the l-treatment at pml = q
l. In this case,
government intervention dominates the market outcome W g = W ∗ > Wm. Intuitively, in this
case, each lab Lj earns its social value µqj as a profit.
If 1 − F (ql) < 1, πl < µql while πh = µq
h and government intervention leads to over-
investment in R&D. Government intervention removes the market bias toward l-treatments.
But it is not obvious that government intervention raises (static and dynamic) welfare com-
pared to the market outcome. If the over-investment distortion exceeds the under-investment
distortion, it is better that the government does not impose q = ql. It is not hard to generate
examples where this is the case. In particular, this can happen when a country is so poor that
πl is very low under government intervention and therefore the over-investment distortion is
big.
Example 1 Assume all consumers have the same income β < ql and the quality signal is
uninformative g = 1
2
. Further, c(e) = 1
2
e2. In this case, the market does not unravel as
pml = p
m
h = β < q
l < q̄l = q̄h =
qh+ql
2
. Expected total welfare is given by




which is quadratic in e. We find that27
e∗ = µ(qh − ql)
em = µ(qh − ql)/2
eg = µ(qh − β)
Because W is quadratic, it is the case that Wm > W g if and only if eg − e∗ > e∗ − em. Hence,
if qh < 3ql, there exists β low enough such that government intervention stimulates R&D but
reduces overall welfare W .
Summarizing we find the following. Government intervention q = ql raises welfare compared
to the market outcome if most people can afford to buy the l-treatment on the uninsured market
at a price close to ql. As most people can afford to buy the l-treatment, the static efficiency
loss is small. Since most people can afford to pay ql, πl is close to µq
l and the over-investment
distortion is small.
Hence, if a country is fairly rich (in the sense that most people can afford to pay ql on
the uninsured market), government using CE analysis to determine which treatments can be
covered by health insurance tends to be welfare enhancing.
If the country is fairly poor such that (i) the insurance market does not unravel and (ii)
the over-investment distortion (with government intervention) exceeds the under-investment
distortion (without intervention), overall welfare is higher without government intervention.
6. Market solutions
This section considers potential market solutions to the problem that consumers do not know
the value of treatments at the moment that they buy health insurance.
6.1. Exclusivity clauses
Above, we derived conditions under which government intervention improves on the market
outcome by excluding l-treatments from health insurance. Question we analyze here is: if we
allow for richer contracts, can the market replicate the government outcome? A full analysis
of all contracting possibilities for labs and insurers is beyond the scope of this paper. However,
it seems natural to analyze the use of exclusion clauses. First, the government intervention
is a form of exclusion and now we allow the market parties to use a similar clause in their
contracts. Second, health insurance contracts have exclusion clauses in them by specifying
which treatments are and which are not insured. As a court must be able to judge the insurance
contract in case of dispute between insurer and insured, the exlusion clauses in health insurance
contracts need to be contractible. We now allow insurers and labs to contract on the exclusion
clauses in insurance contracts. In particular, we are interested in the case where an insurer’s
contract with a h-lab specifies that the insurer cannot cover l-treatments. To illustrate, if
treatment 1 is h and 2 is l, then the contract between insurers and L1 states that insurers
cannot cover treatment 2.
27Assuming that µ is small enough that we can ignore corner solutions.
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To analyse this, we consider the case where the government outcome clearly dominates
the market outcome. Assume that F (ql) = 1 while we maintain (5). Further, the signal is
uninformative (g = 1
2
). Then the government intervention implements first best (W g = W ∗)
while Wm < W g. Can the use of exclusion contracts by market participants bring Wm close to
W g?
As we argue below, it seems reasonable to assume that labs and insurers contract after
the treatments have been invented. Then exclusion is only useful/necessary in case q̄1 = q̄2 =
(qh + ql)/2: there is one l-treatment and one h-treatment. Because consumers cannot observe
individual quality levels qj , they need to form beliefs. To get an effect of exclusion, we consider
the following beliefs: if only one treatment is covered in the health insurance market, then
the h-treatment is covered by insurance.28 We check whether the combination of exclusion
clauses and this belief structure can raise dynamic efficiency in the market outcome (without
government intervention).
Three remarks. First, this equilibrium is clearly not unique. If consumers’ beliefs would
ignore the number of covered treatments, we would be back in the analysis of section 4 and ex-
clusion would have no effect. Second, this inference by consumers is already quite sophisticated.
Perhaps, this is more than one can expect from a market. Three, we do not derive conditions
under which such an equilibrium exists. We derive bounds on the equilibrium payoffs, if an
equilibrium exists. Our point is: even if we assume that this can be done in a market, it is not
as effective as the government setting q = ql.
The following result shows that exclusion contracts cannot achieve first best. Intuitively,
the problem is that h-labs need to compensate insurers for excluding low quality treatments.
This compensation to insurers reduces the profits that h-labs can earn below µqh. As l-labs can
always earn µql on the uninsured market (F (ql) = 0 by assumption), the incentive for research
effort is below the first best incentive µ(qh − ql) (that the government can achieve by setting
q = ql).
Proposition 6 Assume players can use exclusion clauses. Consider the case where q1 =
ql, q2 = q
h and q̄1 = q̄2 = q̄ =
qh+ql
2
. Assume that if only one treatment is covered in the
health insurance market, consumers believe that only the h-treatment is covered by insurance.




h } in the offer game and πh ≤
µ(1− F (pmh ))p
m
h + ε in the bidding game.
As F (qh) > 0, we see that πh < µq
h in the offer game. If we strengthen assumption (5)
slightly to F (qh − ε) > 0 we also have πh < µq
h in the bidding game. Since πl ≥ µq
l, the use
of exclusion contracts does not lead to first best dynamic efficiency as πh − πl < µ(q
h − ql).
The use of exclusion clauses does help insurers to raise profits. Indeed, the h-lab needs
to convince insurers to exclusively cover h-treatments. An insurer can deviate and cover the
l-treatment at a price p̃l close to q
l. As consumers then value each covered treatment at
q̄ > ql (because two treatments are covered in the health insurance market), such a deviation
is profitable for an insurer. The h-lab needs to leave insurers some rent (th < 0) to prevent
this deviation from being profitable. This is consistent with the idea in the health economics
literature that formularies are used by insurers to raise their profits.29
28Just to be clear: the beliefs do not say “if an insurer covers only one treatment, it covers the h-treatment”.
Such beliefs cannot be part of an equilibrium.
29See, for instance, McGuire (2011b, section 3.2) and references therein.
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Above, we assume that parties contract at stage 3 using exclusion clauses. If we would
assume that market parties can come together in stage 0, use Coasian bargaining and commit
to a policy, they could implement q = ql. The contracts signed at stage 0 would then specify
that insurers at stage 4 will not cover l-treatments. By raising research effort e closer to the
efficient outcome, total welfare goes up and with F (ql) = 0, no surplus is left to consumers.
This implies that exclusion clauses with q = ql increase total profits and hence is desirable for
both labs and insurers at stage 0.
For several reasons, it is unlikely that the market can contract at stage 0 and achieve the
first best outcome. First, the number of parties that bargain in period 0 may be quite large.
Certainly, when taking into account that many research projects will not lead to a safe and
effective treatment.30 As it is not known ex ante which labs will be successful, all of them need
to be present in period 0. The Coase theorem is unlikely to hold with that many participating
parties.
Second, at time 0 parties may be cash constraint. It is usually hard to get money from
the capital market to finance high risk R&D projects. Therefore, labs may not be able to
compensate insurers at stage 0 for foregoing coverage of l-treatments. Hence, labs may be
forced to postpone compensating payments till after the innovation. But then the compensation
scheme will affect research incentives making it hard to achieve first best.
Third, it is not likely that parties can credibly commit to their strategy. Again considering
the pharmaceutical market, it takes about 12 years from the idea of a new drug to actually
selling it (see Danzon 2011, pp. 524, Scherer 2000, pp. 1308 and Weisbrod 1991, pp. 535). Few
firms can make a commitment over such a long period. Although one might argue that the big
pharmaceutical companies are long run players, many of the drugs that they sell were actually
invented by small start up companies.31 And these small companies need to commit as well.
Indeed, if only the big pharmaceutical companies commit to q = ql, the start up company that
invented a l-treatment will be tempted to sell to insurers directly (instead of selling out to a big
pharma company) to benefit from q̄ > ql. Also in the time frame of a decade, new insurance
companies can enter the market that were not present at stage 0.
Therefore, we assume that parties in the market can only sign contracts after the treatments
have been invented. That is, in stage 3 of the game presented in section 3.2.
6.2. insurer reputation
Another market based solution is that insurers build a reputation for only covering h-treatments.
Consumers then value each treatment covered by this insurer at qh.
This reputation mechanism can improve the market outcome. However, it is not as ef-
fective as government intervention. Consider an insurer with a reputation for covering only
h-treatments. This insurer can deviate and include a l-treatment for coverage. Such a devia-
tion is profitable in the short run: consumers value the additional treatment as a h-treatment
while the l-lab is willing to sell at a low price. This short run gain needs to be weighed against
the long run loss of reputation; say, at some point consumers may find out that they have been
30Danzon (2011, pp. 524) and Morton and Kyle (2011, pp. 773) note that for the pharmaceutical sector there
is a less than 5% probability that pre-clinical research leads to a product that can be sold on the market.
31See Morton and Kyle (2011, pp. 775) on the movement of innovative activity outside large vertically in-
tegrated pharmaceutical firms. This is sometimes referred to as the shift to vertical specialization. Also see
Danzon (2011, pp. 522).
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cheated and switch to another insurer. This is only a loss, if the insurer with the h-reputation
makes strictly positive profits. This happens if the h-labs leave a strictly positive rent to the
insurer.
Hence, as in the previous subsection, we find that πh < µq
h. If πl ≥ µq
l the incentive for
labs to invest in h-treatments is lower than first best: πh − πl < µ(q
h − ql).
6.3. insurance contracts signal quality
Above we assume that insurers know the value added of each new treatment. It is natural to
wonder whether insurers can signal the quality of a treatment by the conditions under which
the treatment is reimbursed. For instance, could a high co-payment on a new treatment signal
that the quality is high? At the moment that a patient needs a treatment, she is advised by
a physician. The physician could then tell the patient that the value of the treatment is lower
than the co-payment.
The problem here is that an insurer covering a low quality treatment can always mimic
such behaviour. If a high co-payment would signal high quality, an insurer covering a low
quality treatment can set a high co-payment as well. If the patient then decides not to use the
treatment because of the co-payment, even better from the insurer’s point of view.
Hence it is hard to see how an insurer can signal quality in the one-shot version of the game.
In a repeated setting, reputation can play a role, as discussed above.
7. Extensions
This section discusses some extensions of the basic model.
7.1. more than two treatments
There are two ways in which we can consider more than two treatments in this model. First,
we can consider more than one subset of the partition of all treatments. As mentioned, utility
in equation (3) is linear. In the absence of co-morbidity, overall utility is the sum of utility for
each subset and hence the analysis above applies.
Second, we can allow for more than two treatments in a subset. In this case, we also
find that the government intervention excluding l-treatments raises research for breakthrough
treatments. See the webappendix mentioned in footnote 13 for the analysis of this case.
7.2. co-morbidity
Above, we assumed that a patient could have one condition only and hence needed at most one
treatment. If some patients need both treatments (say, with probability µ2), this changes the
profit maximizing price on the uninsured market. Above, with prices puj (j = 1, 2), lab j sells
µ(1− F (puj )) treatments on the uninsured market. Allowing for co-morbidity and assume –for
simplicity– that everyone buys treatment 1, then treatment 2 is sold to µ(1− µ)(1− F (pu2)) +
µ2(1−F (pu1 +p
u
2)) uninsured patients. This interaction between research labs on the uninsured
market is left for future research. For µ small, µ2 is close enough to 0 that firms can ignore the
co-morbidity term in their demand function on the uninsured market. Then the analysis above
applies.
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7.3. positive production costs
Above we normalized the marginal production costs c to zero. Assume that ch, cl > 0. Now it
can happen that qh − ch > ql − cl > 0 > q̄h − c
h. In the market equilibrium, insurers will not
cover the h-treatment as labs want a price that covers marginal production costs p̃h ≥ ch. This
can explain why medical innovations with high value added diffuse rather slowly (Phelps, 2000).
As above, the government can exclude l-treatments from coverage. However, this is costly if
ql − cl is quite high and many people cannot afford to buy the l-treatment on the uninsured
market.
An alternative is that the government mandates coverage of the h-treatment to correct
consumer misperception. For instance, Kleinke (2001) suggests mandated coverage of certain
drugs at the federal level.
7.4. segmented insurance market
A disadvantage of the government intervention described above is that people with low income
cannot afford l-treatments as they are not allowed to be covered by health insurance. This
is a loss in static efficiency because l-treatments still create value from a social point of view.
Hence, one may wonder whether the government cannot correct consumers’ misperceptions of
treatments’ value in a less costly way.
For instance, the government could publish the results of its CE analysis on a website.
Consumers would then know the value of the treatments covered by health insurers. If an
insurer would drop treatment j from its coverage, consumers would –after checking the CE
website– reduce their valuation of this contract by µqj . This would make sure that in equilibrium
research labs receive their social value as profits.
The model above cannot address this government policy. The model is not explicit about
why consumers do not know q1,2 exactly when buying insurance. Presumably more is needed
than a spreadsheet with CE results to make sure that consumers can make informed choices
about the value of treatments. Medicine is complicated and a degree takes a couple of years.
So it seems unlikely that just providing information will resolve this issue.
Another option is that the government segments the health insurance market. For instance,
there could be mandatory basic insurance that only covers h-treatments. As in countries like
Denmark, the Netherlands and Switzerland (Thomson et al., 2012), the government determines
which treatments are covered for this insurance. Then there can also be a supplementary
insurance market which covers other treatments. Government can then announce that each
treatment covered by mandatory insurance is a h-treatment. Consumers can get coverage of
l-treatments on the supplementary market.
If indeed consumers can make a clear distinction between mandatory and supplementary
insurance, this two tiered insurance market can help to resolve consumer ignorance about the
value added of treatments; while allowing for insurance coverage of l-treatments.
7.5. other forms of consumer ignorance
The paper is about consumers’ misperception of the value of treatments, at the moment they
buy health insurance. By using an imperfect signal of the value of treatments, they overvalue
some treatments but are right on average. We cited evidence consistent with both these features.
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However, there are other mistakes that consumers can make that are similar in nature. We
discuss three of these.
First, a certain treatment may have high value for condition A but low (or no) value for
condition B. Skinner (2011) and Chandra and Skinner (2012) call this Category II treatments
and give examples like stents and back surgery. If the social value of a treatment is negative
for condition B, it is efficient if the treatment is excluded for this condition. However, if the
consumer does not know this variation in value (Rothberg et al., 2010, pp. 311), an insurer
trying to limit the use of the treatment32 may lose customers. In the spirit of the model above,
this can be formalized as follows. The cost of the treatment is denoted c (assumed to be
the same for both conditions), utility of the treatment is denoted qi for condition i = A,B
with qA > c > qB. If the consumer is ignorant of the distinction between A and B and gets
an uninformative signal (g = 1
2
), she values the treatment at q̄A = q̄B = q̄ = (q
A + qB)/2.
We assume that q̄ > c. If an insurer excludes the treatment for condition B, the consumer’s
reduction in valuation for this insurance contract is given by µq̄ > µqB. Hence, the market
cannot resolve this issue for the same reason as above. Efficiency would improve if a government
agency excludes the treatment for people suffering from B. Currently, the FDA does not try
to do this: “Once a drug is approved for treating one condition, doctors can legally use it for
other things” (Deyo and Patrick, 2005, pp. 156).
Second, consumers may not value the information generated by a clinical trial testing a
new treatment. This makes it hard for an insurer to insist on such trials (Garber 2001, pp.
79, Deyo and Patrick 2005, pp. 57 and Chandra and Skinner 2012, pp. 667). Suppose a new
treatment has been invented with a benefit that can either be high qh or low ql with equal
probability and expected benefit q̄ = (qh + ql)/2. Marginal production costs are denoted c.
Assume that qh > q̄ > c > ql. There is social value in an experiment determining whether
the treatment’s value is high or low. However, an insurer requiring that its customers partici-
pate in a medical trial if the value of the treatment is not known, is likely to lose customers.
Indeed, patients prefer to get q̄ > c rather than run the risk of being treated with a placebo.
Deyo and Patrick (2005, chapter 4) give a number of US examples of new treatments that were
used under market pressure without being tested in randomized trials first. In the words of
Skinner (2011) and Chandra and Skinner (2012) these are called Category III treatments. In
line with the analysis above, Chandra and Skinner (2012, pp. 670) find that the “US often
experiences rapid diffusion of expensive pharmaceutical treatments with uncertain benefits”.
The model suggests that the market cannot solve this by itself and government intervention is
needed.
Finally, consumers may not know the substitution patterns between treatments. Suppose
that there is a (new) treatment which creates value qn; consumers correctly perceive this value.
However, there is an existing treatment that creates value qo when treating the same condition.
If consumers are not aware of treatment o, they will reduce their valuation of an insurance
contract that does not cover n but does cover o by µqn, instead of µ(qn − qo). This increases
the bargaining power of the research lab that invented n. Hence, even if qn − qo is small, this
32It is not clear that this is always possible. However, the point is that if it would be possible –e.g. by explicitly
specifying that treatment can only be used for condition A or by requiring a second opinion before paying for
the treatment– it may not be profitable for an insurer to impose such restrictions. Chandra and Skinner (2012,
pp. 646) give the example of stents which have substantial benefits only if the patient is treated within the first
12 hours following a heart attack. This is a contractible condition that could be used by insurers.
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lab may be able to charge insurers a high price for its new treatment.
8. Conclusion
This paper starts from the premise that consumers do not perfectly know the value of each
treatment at the moment that they buy health insurance. The question is whether health
insurers can correct consumers’ misperceptions such that treatments earn their social value as
a profit.
We show in a model that captures salient features of the health insurance market –like
consumers buy insurance to guarantee access to care and insurers contract privately on the
treatment procurement market– that treatments with low value added can get overpaid in
equilibrium. This is consistent with examples of treatments that hardly add value compared to
existing treatments, but are sold at a high price (Deyo and Patrick, 2005; Light and Lexchin,
2012). This free riding of low quality treatments on high value innovations reduces dynamic
efficiency.
The government can raise research efforts to find breakthrough treatments by abolishing
treatments with low value added from health insurance coverage. As low quality treatments
are no longer covered by health insurance, people with low income have no longer access to
these treatments. This reduces static efficiency.
If the country is rich enough, such that most people can buy low quality treatments on the
uninsured market at their social value, government intervention raises welfare. Hence, even in
a private insurance market there is a role for a government institute like NICE to determine
the treatments that can be covered by health insurance.
We argued above that the market cannot correct consumers’ misperception about the value
of new treatments. However, it is not obvious that the government is always able to make such
a correction. For instance, in the 1980/90s the state of Oregon tried to ration Medicaid services
using CE analysis. See Dranove (2003, chapter 7) for a discussion of the public pressure on
the government and its consequences. It seems fair to say that politicians find it hard to resist
such public pressure. One reason for the relative success of NICE can be that it is placed at
arm’s length from the political arena. This makes it somewhat easier to resist public demands
for coverage of a new treatment.33 Hence, we make the case for the government to establish
an institute that determines which treatments can be covered by insurance, even in a private
health insurance market. As with central banks, it may be a good idea that this institute enjoys
independence from direct government intervention. The optimal governance structure of such
an institute is left for future research.
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A. Proof of results
Proof of proposition 1
Offer game: First, we will argue that in a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium it is the
case that tj = 0.
Let Aj denote the set of offers (p̃j , tj) that an insurer is willing to accept and offer coverage
of treatment j. Suppose –by contradiction– that there exists (p̃j, tj) ∈ Aj with tj > 0. Let
t̄j > 0 denote the largest such tj > 0 in Aj . Note that such a largest element exists because
the total profit on the market cannot exceed µqh (and hence an insurer never accepts tj > µq
h)
and because of the money unit ε there are only a countable number of candidate elements of
Aj .
As the contracts offered are private information and we consider the case of interim un-
observability, an insurer’s price setting strategy in the health insurance market only depends
on the details of its own contracts. Given the offer from the other lab −j (which the insurer
may or may not accept), an insurer raises its premium σ by ∆σj(p̃j , tj) if it offers coverage of
treatment j.
Now define p̄j = argmaxp{∆σj(p, t̄j)|(p, t̄j) ∈ Aj}. This is the price p̃j that leads to the
biggest increase in σ given that j is covered and given tj = t̄j .
Given the offer (p̄j, t̄j) to insurer Ia which Ia accepts and offers coverage of j at premium
increase ∆σj(p̄j , t̄j), two situations can occur for Ia:
1. Ia expects a market share, sa, strictly below 1. As there are two or more insurers, this
implies sa ≤ 1/2. This means that the margin that Ia earns is at most 2ε (if it would be
3ε or more, it is optimal for Ia to reduce σ by ε and capture the whole market). Hence
πa ≤ µsa2ε − t̄j < 0 because t̄j ≥ ε (as ε is the smallest money unit that can be used),
µ < 1 and sa ≤ 1/2.
2. Ia expects a market share equal to 1. Although the offer p̄j, t̄j can be part of a deviation
by Lj , we consider this deviation in the context of a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium.
That is, the other lab, L−j , makes the equilibrium offer (p̃−j, t−j) to all insurers who
then set ∆σ−j(p̃−j, t−j).
34 Note that ∆σ−j = 0 if (p̃−j , t−j) /∈ A−j and treatment −j is
not covered by health insurance. Then sa = 1 together with the definition of p̄j implies
that other insurers received an offer with tj < t̄j . However, since (p̄j , t̄j) ∈ Aj , the other
insurers would have accepted offer (p̄j , t̄j). As the offer with t̄j strictly increases Lj ’s
profits in this case, this is the offer that Ia expects Lj to make to the other insurers under
wary beliefs. But this contradicts that Ia expects sa = 1.
Hence in both cases we have a contradiction. Therefore tj ≤ 0.
Now we can verify whether the equilibrium in the proposition is indeed an equilibrium of
the offer game. That is, there are no profitable deviations. We go over each of the possible





• Lj can deviate by offering p̂j ≥ q̄j + ε. In this case, insurers receiving such a deviating
offer do not offer coverage of treatment j. Indeed, to offer coverage in a profitable way
requires ∆σj ≥ µp̂j while consumers only value this coverage at µq̄j < µp̂j . Hence offering
34Deviating offers by Lj and L−j cannot be coordinated as offers are made simultaneously and independently.
34
coverage of j in this case reduces an insurer’s profits. Therefore the insurer will not offer
coverage and the deviation reduces Lj ’s profits.
• Lj can decide not to make any offers to insurers and sell only on the uninsured market.




2 this is not profitable for the lab
with the highest q. As q1 ≤ q2, q̄1 ≥ q1, p
m
1 ≤ q1 such a deviation is not profitable for the
other lab either.
• Offering puj < q̄j reduces profits as insurers will ask their customers to buy treatment j
on the uninsured market (and reimburse them later).
• Lj can deviate by offering p̂j ≤ q̄j − ε to some (or all) insurers. As this cannot be
accompanied with tj > 0 (above we showed that offers with tj > 0 are not acceptable to
insurers), it cannot raise Lj ’s profits.
• Offering tj < 0 clearly also does not increase Lj ’s profits.
• Given an offer p̃j = q̄j with tj = 0, an insurer cannot gain by rejecting this offer. To
see this, consider the case where Ia decided to drop j from coverage. To keep consumers
indifferent between the old insurance package (with j) and the deviating package without
j, Ia’s premium σ has to fall by µq̄j. Hence Ia’s revenues and costs fall by the same
amount. Therefore this deviation is not profitable.
Next, consider equilibrium in case q̄j < p
m
2 (1 − F (p
m
2 )) (note that this cannot happen if
q1 = q2). In this case, the insurance market unravels. As shown above, if both treatments
would be covered, L2 would earn µq̄j. But if L2 decides not to sell to insurers and only sell on
the uninsured market, it earns µpm2 (1− F (p
m
2 )) which is higher by assumption. Hence, in this
case, the insurance market unravels and treatment 2 is only sold on the uninsured market.
Since q̄l ≥ q
l ≥ pml (1 − F (p
m
l )), l-lab has no incentive to sell on the uninsured market.
Hence, if the signals are L,H and one lab sells on the uninsured market, consumer understands
that insurance covers the l-treatment. No party can increase profits by deviating from the
equilibrium.




2 . We consider potential
deviations and argue in each case that the deviation is not profitable:
• If L2 rejects all offers from insurers, it can only sell on the uninsured market. The
deviation profit then equals π̂2 = µp
m
2 (1 − F (p
m
2 )) which –by assumption– is lower than
µ(q̄2 − ε). Hence this deviation is not profitable. As p
m
1 ≤ q1 and q̄1 ≥ q1, the uninsured
profit for L1 cannot exceed π1. Hence this deviation is not profitable for either lab.
• Lj can reject offers from some (but not all) insurers. This does not raise profits.
• Setting p̂uj < q̄j−ε reduces profits as insurers ask their customers to buy j on the uninsured
market.
• Consider deviations for insurers. Ia sets σ̂a > µ(q̄1+ q̄2−2ε). Then all consumers strictly
prefer to buy from other insurers. Setting σ̂a < µ(q̄1 + q̄2 − 2ε) leads to a loss. Hence
deviations with σ cannot raise an insurer’s profits.
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• Ia drops treatment j from coverage. This allows Ia to reduce its premium with q̄j − ε.
However, consumers’ valuation of Ia’s product falls by q̄j . Hence this is not a profitable
deviation as revenue (σ) falls more than costs.
• Finally, consider deviations in Ia’s offer to Lj . Note that Lj can reject the offer from
Ia and accept the offers from other insurers who follow the equilibrium (as the other
insurers do not know when setting σ that Ia’s (deviating) offer was rejected). If Ia’s offer
is rejected, consumers strictly prefer health insurance from other insurers (since they offer
coverage with additional perceived utility µq̄j at an increased premium of µ(q̄j − ε)) and
do not buy from Ia. Hence Lj’s profit after rejecting Ia’s deviating offer equals µ(q̄j − ε).
In other words, in response to a deviation by Ia, Lj can guarantee a profit equal to its
equilibrium profit πj . Hence a change in Ia’s offer for tj only cannot be profitable: t̂j < 0
is rejected by Lj and t̂j > 0 leads to a loss for Ia.
• Now, consider a deviating offer (p̂j, t̂j). If p̂j > q̄j, Ia will raise σa by at least µp̂j. As
consumers only value the inclusion of treatment j by µq̄j , this deviation does not raise
profits.
• Next, consider p̂j = q̄j. If Lj would accept this deviation offer from Ia, she has two
options. On the one hand, she can accept some of the offers made by the other insurers.
As Ia has to raise his premium by µp̂j to cover treatment j, while the other insurers raise
their premium by µ(q̄j − ε) < µp̂j , this is not a profitable deviation. On the other hand,
she can reject all other offers. As Ia will raise σ by µp̂j to cover treatment j, consumers
are indifferent between Ia’s product (with j covered) and the other insurers products
(without j). Hence Ia’s market share equals 1/n with n ≥ 2 insurers in the market. The
highest profit that Lj can earn in this case equals q̄j/n. However, the assumption on
the smallest money unit ε (equation (4)) implies that µq̄j/n < πj . Hence this is not a
profitable deviation.
• Finally, consider p̂j ≤ q̄j − 2ε. As above, if Lj accepts this offer, she can decide to accept
(some of) the other offers or not. The same reasoning as before shows that this deviation
is not profitable.




2 , it is more profitable for L2 to sell on the uninsured market.
Hence insurance unravels and only ql is covered in equilibrium. The reasoning here is the same
as for the offer game. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 2
In the offer game the highest equilibrium profit that lab Lj can earn when the insurance
market does not unravel equals µq̄j . As shown in the proof of proposition 1, if lab j makes
an offer with p̃j > q̄j the insurer will drop j from its health insurance. To keep consumers
indifferent it will reduce its premium σ by µq̄j . In this way, its costs decrease faster than its
revenues and hence not covering j leads to higher profits for the insurer.
Does there exist an equilibrium in the offer game where πj ≤ µ(q̄j − 2ε)? No, because
Lj can always offer insurers p̃j = q̄j − ε. Insurers are always willing to accept this offer (no
matter what they believe about competitors), cover treatment j and increase σ by µq̄j. Since
consumers are indifferent between insurance without coverage of j and insurance with coverage
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of j that is µq̄j more expensive in terms of its premium, the insurer can never lose accepting
such an offer (and it may win).
To verify the claim for the bidding game, we check both inequalities:
1. πj ≤ µ(q̄j − ε). Suppose not, that is





j > siµq̄j . But then Ii has a profitable deviation: drop the contract with
Lj and reduce σi by µq̄j. This deviation does not affect si but Ii’s profits increase
as Ii’s costs decrease faster than its revenues;






j = µq̄j and
∑




j > siµq̄j ;
however, this is not possible as shown in the previous point). Further, it must be




j = siµq̄j for each i ∈ I. Let i
∗ = argmaxi∈I si. It follows
that si∗ ≥ 1/n. We show that insurer Ii∗ has a profitable deviation. Suppose
that Ii∗ offers p̂j = q̄j − ε, t̂j = 0 to Lj . If Lj accepts this offer, indeed Ii∗ has a
profitable deviation and Lj earns (at least) π̂j = µ(q̄j − ε). We show that Lj cannot
credibly reject Ii∗ ’s deviating offer. If Lj rejects the offer, its profits cannot exceed
(1 − si∗)µq̄j ≤
n−1
n
µq̄j. However, π̂j >
n−1
n
µq̄j because of assumption (4) on the
smallest money unit ε. Hence Lj cannot credibly reject Ii∗ ’s offer and hence Ii∗ has
a profitable deviation.
Hence in each case there is a contradiction. Therefore πj ≤ µ(q̄j − ε).
2. πj ≥ µ(q̄j − 2ε). Suppose not, that is assume –by contradiction– that πj ≤ µ(q̄j − 3ε).
We write πj = µ(q̄j − yε) with y ≥ 3 and total insurer profits equal
∑n
i=a πi = µxε with
x ≤ y. We go over the following cases:
• x = 0: Ia can deviate and offer to Lj : p̂aj = µ(q̄j − 2ε), t̂aj = 0. Lj accepts this offer
and rejects all other offers. Profit maximizing premium choice for Ia then leads to
ŝa = 1. Lj ’s profits increase by accepting this deviating offer as µ(q̄j−2ε) > µ(q̄j−yε)
for y ≥ 3. Further, π̂a ≥ µε > 0 = πa.
• x = 1: there exists at least one insurer (say, Ia) with πa ≤ µε/n. Same deviation for
Ia as under the previous point (p̂aj = µ(q̄j − 2ε)) raises Ia’s profits and is acceptable
to Lj .
• x ≥ 2: There exists at least one insurer (say, Ia) with πa ≤ xµε/n. If Ia deviates by
cutting its premium by ε, its profits equal π̂a = µ(x− 1)ε > µxε/n ≥ πa (with strict
inequality because n ≥ 3).35
Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 3 With g ∈ 〈1
2
, 1〉 there can be three cases, depending on the signal
(with g = 1 there is only one case and with g = 1
2
there are two cases: cases 1 and 3 below).
35In principle, it could be the case that insurers earn profits via tj < 0 (instead of the margin σ − µp̃j).
However, this clearly cannot be an equilibrium. First, suppose that all insurers have tj < 0, then Lj should
reject some of these offers and save on the transfer tj to insurers. Second, if some insurer does not have tj < 0,
it can deviate by setting p̂aj = µ(q̄j − 2ε), t̂aj = 0; as in the case of x = 0.
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Case 1 gql + (1− g)qh > (1− F (pmh ))p
m






h + (1− e)((g2 + (1− g)2)ql + 2g(1− g)qh))+
(1− e−j)(e((g
2 + (1− g)2)qh + 2g(1− g)ql) + (1− e)ql)
)
− c(e)
The first order condition for e can be written as
c′(e) = µ((g2 + (1− g)2)qh − (1− 2g(1− g))ql)
Hence we find for the market outcome in this case that
c′(em) = µ(1− 2g(1− g))(qh − ql) < µ(qh − ql)
if g ∈ [1
2
, 1〉 and thus em < e∗.
Case 2 (1− g)ql + gqh > (1− F (pmh ))p
m
h > gq






h + (1− e)(g(gql + (1− g)qh) + (1− g)ql))+
(1− e−j)(e(g(gq
h + (1− g)ql) + (1− g)(1− F (pmh ))p
m




Hence equilibrium em is determined by
c′(em) = µ(g2(qh − ql) + (1− g)((1− F (pmh ))p
m
h − q
l) + em(1− g)(qh − (1− F (pmh ))p
m
h ))
≤ µ(g2(qh − ql) + (1− g)(qh − ql))
because em ≤ 1. Hence, we see that g < 1 implies that em < e∗.
Case 3 (1− F (pmh ))p
m
h > (1− g)q









e(1− F (pmh ))p
m




Equilibrium em is determined by
c′(em) = µ((1− F (pmh ))p
m
h − q
l + em(qh − (1− F (pmh ))p
m
h ))
Since (1− F (pmh ))p
m
h < q
h, em < 1, we find that em < e∗. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 4With q = ql, l-treatment can only be sold on the uninsured market.





With this government policy, consumers understand that insured treatments are h-treatments.
Hence, the updated value of insured treatments equals q̄j = q
h. It then follows from proposition
1 that πh = µq
h (ignoring ε in the bidding game). Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 6 Use of exclusion clauses is only relevant in the case with one
l-treatment and one h-treatment. Allowing for such clauses in the offer game, the h-lab offers
contracts to insurers with the clause that the insurer is not allowed to cover the l-treatment.
Hence if an insurer –accepting such a contract– does cover the l-treatment, it is not possible to
cover the h-treatment as its h-contract is void and the h-lab can charge p̃h = +∞.
38
Suppose that the claim in the proposition is not true. That is, assume –by contradiction–
that the equilibrium profit for the h-lab satisfies:
πh ≥ µ(q̄ + ε) (A.1)
in the case where q̄ > (1− F (pmh ))p
m
h .
We claim that the equilibrium profit of every insurer Ii must satisfy πi ≥ µ(q̄ − q
l − ε).
Suppose not. That is, assume that there is an insurer, say Ia, with πa < µ(q̄−q
l−ε). Then the
l-lab can make Ia an offer p̂l = q
l + ε, t̂l = 0. This offer –if accepted– raises l-lab’s profits above
its profits on the uninsured market (µql). If Ia accepts and sells coverage of the l-treatment
(only) at σ̂a = µq̄ then all consumers buy from Ia because the other insurers sell at σ > µq̄ (and
given that both treatments are covered on the insurance market, consumers value coverage of
a treatment at µq̄). Hence Ia’s profits equal π̂a = µ(q̄ − q
l − ε) > πa. Hence in equilibrium it
must be the case for each insurer that πi ≥ µ(q̄ − q
l − ε).
It follows that the h-lab’s equilibrium profit satisfies πh ≤ µq
h − nπi. Combining this
inequality with equation (A.1) and the inequality for πi, we find









which contradicts the assumption on the smallest money unit in equation (4).
Now we turn to the bidding game, where insurers make offers to labs with exclusionary
clauses. That is, insurer Ii offers the h-lab a contract that specifies that Ii will not sell coverage
of the l-treatment. First, note that offers by insurers to the l-lab with p̃l = q
l, tl = 0 are always
accepted by l-labs (even though insurers do not offer coverage of the l-treatment in an exclusive
equilibrium). Now assume –by contradiction– that




h + 2ε (A.2)
This implies that the h-treatment is covered by health insurers and that they charge σ > µql
because pmh ≥ q
l (as F (ql) = 1 by assumption).
Suppose that the insurer with the highest share in h-lab’s profits (denoted Ia with sa ≥ 1/n)
deviates and reduces ta by ε. If h-lab rejects Ia’s offer, Ia will offer coverage of l-treatment (with
p̃l = ql, tl = 0) and set a premium σ̂a = min{σ, µq̄} > µq
l which implies that Ia’s market share
will not fall (because σ̂a ≤ µq̄ and σ̂a ≤ σ) and increase if σ̂a < σ.
Because Ia was the biggest contributor to h-lab’s profits and Ia does not lose market share,
profit of the h-lab cannot exceed n−1
n
πh. This implies that it is not credible for h-lab to reject
Ia’s deviating offer because
n−1
n
πh < πh−ε (by equation (4)). It follows that Ia has a profitable
deviation. Therefore in equilibrium equation (A.2) cannot hold.
Q.E.D.
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